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Free Speech and Public Order Exceptions: A Case for
the U.S. Standard
Asma T. Uddin ∗
“An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that
private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply
circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment
when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the
house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same
mob in the form of a placard.”

– John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859)
“Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call
themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name), who directly or
indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith
as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to
accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible
representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious
feelings of Muslims shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three years and shall
also be liable to fine.”

– Pakistani Penal Code 298-C
INTRODUCTION
Every society must deal with speech that could potentially lead to
violence. Governments in several Muslim-majority countries have
struggled to develop proper constitutional protections for free
speech and religious freedom. The challenge has been especially clear
in countries like Pakistan, where religious violence is widespread. Yet,
while the unrest has increased demands for speech restrictions, the
key to stability is liberty.
This Paper will focus on Pakistan’s speech restrictions under its
blasphemy laws—the source of some of the most egregious religious
freedom violations in the world. Pakistan’s blasphemy laws often lead
∗
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to riots, community violence, and infringement of basic human
rights. For example, on May 7, 2014, human rights lawyer Rashid
Rehman was murdered for defending Junaid Hafeez, a poet and
Fulbright scholar, who was accused by his students of insulting the
Prophet Muhammad on Facebook. 1 The accusations were baseless,
but as with most cases of blasphemy charges in Pakistan no real
evidence was needed. Hafeez was charged by the police and was
defenseless without a lawyer when Rehman agreed to represent
Hafeez in court. 2 The government did nothing to protect Rehman,
who received death threats even as he stood in front of the judge in
the courtroom. 3
The blasphemy laws persecute not only Pakistan’s Muslims, but
also its religious minorities. In June 2009, a Pakistani Christian
woman, Aasia Bibi, offered water to fellow farm workers. 4
They refused to accept on the grounds that she was a Christian
and, therefore, they believed the water must be contaminated.
An exchange of words occurred, with each side defending their
religion. Allegedly, Aasia insulted the Prophet Muhammad by
saying, “The Quran is fake and your prophet remained in bed for
one month before his death because he had worms in his ears
and mouth. He married Khadija just for money and, after looting
her, kicked her out of the house.” A few days later, a mob set
upon Aasia, and the police rescued her from certain death.
However, the police later charged her with committing
blasphemy and held her in isolation for 17 months while she
awaited trial. 5

Aasia Bibi was found guilty of blasphemy and the local court
ruled that there were “no mitigating circumstances,” sentencing her

1. Andrew Buncombe & Umair Aziz, Pakistani Lawyer Rashid Rehman Murdered
(May
8,
2014),
After
Taking
on
Blasphemy
Case,
THE INDEPENDENT
http://www.independent.co.uk/ incoming/pakistani-lawyer-rashid-rehman-murdered-aftertaking-on-blasphemy-case-9341021.html.
2. Ali Sethi, Pakistan’s Tyranny of Blasphemy, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2014),
http://nyti.ms/1nhPZIG.
3. Waqar Gillani, Pakistani Activist Shot Dead; Aided Blasphemy Suspects, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2014, at A8, available at http://nyti.ms/1kN6smp.
4. Asma T. Uddin, Blasphemy Laws in Muslim-Majority Countries, REV. FAITH & INT’L
AFF. Summer 2011, at 47, 47.
5. Id. (citations omitted).
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to death by hanging. 6 This unfortunate event reveals the
contradiction of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, which are premised on
protecting public order, but once again appeased rather than
controlled violent extremists, giving them license to bully a religious
minority while the police and justice system looked the other way.
This Paper will explain why and how policy makers can use the
U.S. free speech standard to guide the formulation of free speech
standards in other countries such as Pakistan. Part I will explain the
current state of religious freedom in Pakistan and other similar
countries, in particular as it relates to the religious speech and alleged
blasphemy. Part II will analyze the history of free speech in Pakistan,
comparing and contrasting the era before and after General Zia-ulHaq’s regime. It will also look at how Pakistani law treats religious
speech or blasphemy differently than other types of speech, with a
focus on Pakistani courts’ use of U.S. case law. Lastly, it will discuss
Pakistan’s role internationally with speech-related resolutions at the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
Part III will use the Pakistani courts’ reliance on U.S. case law as
a launch pad for a more detailed comparison between Pakistan’s and
the United States’ use of public order arguments in speech cases.
Part of the exploration of the guiding value of U.S. law is how and
why U.S. free speech jurisprudence arrived at its current state—Part
IV will explore precisely that issue. Finally, in Part V, this Paper will
present policy reasons for what the U.S. model can offer as guidance
to countries that are in the process of developing their free speech
standard. The Paper will conclude with concrete recommendations
for policymakers.
I. BACKGROUND: PAKISTAN AND OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES’
APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS SPEECH
A. Pakistan’s Challenges with Religious Speech
Pakistan is the focus of this Paper for two reasons. First, it
consistently performs very poorly at protecting religious speech and
is thus emblematic of bad free speech law and the consequences of
such laws as explained above. Second, it provides a good example of
domestic courts that have recently sought U.S. guidance by

6. Id.
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referencing U.S. case law, especially concerning public order. These
two factors together make Pakistan a good case study in how U.S.
law can be used to guide the development for broader protections of
free speech law.
Pakistan’s greatest limitations on religious speech were instituted
by an expanded set of blasphemy laws. 7 These laws originate in the
Indian Penal Code of 1860, and were enacted by the British colonial
government. 8 The purpose of the laws was to maintain order in a
multi-religious society and to prevent attacks against members of any
religion. 9 However, after the creation of Pakistan, the push by some
Muslim fundamentalist groups to turn Pakistan into a Sunni Islamic
theocracy began in the 1950s. 10 In 1973, these efforts culminated in
the Constitution’s Repugnancy Clause, Article 227(1). 11 Article
227(1) provides that: “[a]ll existing laws shall be brought in
conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy
Quran and Sunnah, in this Part referred to as the Injunctions of
Islam, and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such
Injunctions.” 12 To ensure that the “Injunctions of Islam” are
followed, the Constitution further established the Islamic Council, a
type of Islamic think-tank for Parliament and the Provincial
Assemblies. 13 General Zia-ul-Haq (Zia) translated these changes into
the country’s blasphemy laws. 14 In 1977, as part of his Islamization
efforts, Zia imposed martial law on Pakistan and “assumed for
himself the power of amending the Constitution.” 15 One of his many
amendments was the addition of five new sections typically referred
to as the blasphemy laws. 16

7. Asma T. Uddin, A Legal Analysis of Ahmadi Persecution in Pakistan, in STATE RESPONSES TO
MINORITY RELIGIONS 81, 82 (David M. Kirkham ed., 2013).
8. Osama Siddique & Zahra Hayat, Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in
Pakistan—Controversial Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications, 17 MINN. J.
INTL L. 303, 336 (2008).
9. Id. at 337 (“[I]t would appear that the purpose of Chapter 15 was the maintenance
of order in a multi-religious society and the containment of attacks targeted at any religion.”).
10. Uddin, supra note 7, at 83.
11. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 227, § 1.
12. Id.
13. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 230, § 1.
14. Siddique, supra note 8, at 310–12.
15. Id. at 314.
16. Id. at 310–12.
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Since the end of Zia’s regime, the number of blasphemy cases
has continued to increase. 17 As of June, Pakistan used its blasphemy
laws to put four people on death row in 2014, now adding up to
seventeen total waiting execution. 18 Nineteen people are
imprisoned for life and sixty-eight attorneys were charged in May
2014 with this same crime after “protest[ing] police abuse.” 19 Not
surprisingly, Pakistan leads the world in the number of people jailed
for blasphemy. 20
However, there is some hope. When making their decisions,
Pakistani domestic courts have referenced U.S. case law. As will be
discussed below, the highest court in Pakistan referenced five U.S.
Supreme Court cases to justify speech restrictions on religious
minorities. 21 The courts have also referenced it at least twice when
dealing with other free speech issues. 22 In fact, the court has looked
to the United States for issues outside of freedom of speech as well. 23
All of this suggests that, at minimum, they are relying on U.S. case
law to legitimize their opinions (even if they may be intentionally
misinterpreting the U.S. law) and, at most, looking to the United
States for legal guidance.
A recent suo moto 24 Pakistani Supreme Court decision (hereafter,
“S.M.C. NO. 1 OF 2014”) also offers hope. 25 The decision came in

17. Id. at 324–27. According to one study, there were only twelve blasphemy cases in
the 1980s during General Zia’s regime, but the following decade saw that number triple, and
from 2000–2007 that number increased again to forty-eight. Id. at 325.
18. Thomas J. Reese & Daniel I. Mark, Pakistan’s War on Conscience, THE
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (June 8, 2014), http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/op-eds/thephiladelphia-inquirer-pakistans-war-conscience.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Zaheeruddin v. State, (1993) 26 SCMR (SC) 1718 (Pak.).
22. See, e.g., Syed Masroor Ahsan and Others v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and Others, (1998)
PLD (SC) 823 (Pak.) (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947); Muhammad Nawaz
Sharif v. President of Pakistan and Others, (1993) PLD (SC) 473 (Pak.)).
23. Watan Party v. Federation of Pakistan, (2011) PLD (SC) 997 (Pak.); Justice
Tassaduq Hussain Jillani, The Rule of Law and the Supreme Court of Pakistan, INT’L ASS’N OF
SUPREME
ADMIN.
JURISDICTIONS,
available
at
http://www.aihja.org/images/users/1/files/pakistan.national
.report_pakistan.en.0.pdf
(referencing a U.S. Supreme Court case and Martin Luther King, Jr.).
24. “Suo moto is a Latin term meaning ‘on its own motion.’ It is used in situations
where a government or court official acts of its own initiative.” Suo Moto Law & Legal
Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/s/suo-moto/.
25. (2014)
S.M.C.
No.
1
of
2014
(SC)
(Pak.),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/smc_1_2014.pdf.
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the aftermath of a series of complaints from different religious
communities (including Christians, Hindus, the Kalash tribe, and
Ismailis) about harassment and violence. 26 These incidents included a
2013 suicide bomb attack on a Peshawar church that killed eightyone people; 27 attempts at forced conversion of members of the
Kalash tribe and Ismailis in Chitral to a different sect within Islam; 28
and the frequent desecration of Hindu temples. 29 In addressing these
incidents, the court explained the special legal protection that the
Pakistan Constitution affords to minorities. 30 Chief Justice Jillani,
quoting a professor from Seattle University School of Law, stated
that “[t]he express guarantees for freedom of belief and practice of
religion, rule of law, due process, equal protection, and a progressive
legislative agenda, proffered by the leadership of the Pakistan
Movement, constitute an implied social covenant with religious
minorities in Pakistan.” 31 Jillani also explained that Pakistan’s origins
lie in the principle of liberty for all: 32 “One of the famous Fourteen
Points enumerated by Mohammad Ali Jinnah on proposed
constitutional changes was that ‘full religious liberty, i.e. liberty of
belief, worship and observance, propaganda, association and
education shall be guaranteed to [all] communities.’” 33
As will be examined in detail below, the opinion reflects a
remarkable change in tone compared to recent judicial treatments of
religion-based violence. 34 And again, it uses the U.S. cultural and
legal context to bolster its broad interpretation of religious freedom.
The court not only quotes an American law professor, but in
explaining that the country must “undo the injustices done to the
minorities,” the court relies on the U.S. Supreme Court decision
Brown v. Board of Education. 35

26. Id. at 4.
27. Id. at 2, 4.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. at 11–12.
31. Id. at 12.
32. Id. at 12–13.
33. Id. at 12 (citing Sekrut Yakhni, The Fourteen Points of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad
Ali Jinnah, PAKISTAN DEFENCE (Aug. 14, 2010), http://defence.pk/threads/the-fourteenpoints-of-quaid-e-azam-muhammad-ali-jinnah.69201/).
34. See infra Part II.
35. S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014 at 26 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
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Yet, while this case is a major step in the right direction, much
work lies ahead in ensuring religious liberty in Pakistan. Even as
Jillani explained in detail the rights afforded to religious minorities
and the religious “conscience” under Article 20 of the Constitution,
he completely failed to mention Pakistan’s extensive list of globallynotorious blasphemy laws, which on their face violate any
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. 36 So long as blasphemy
laws continue to fuel religion-based violence, little will change in the
courts and in the community.
Pakistani courts—like many courts struggling with the treatment
of potentially controversial speech—are concerned about public
order. Their concern is that blasphemous speech runs the risk of
angering people, who will then become violent. Even though the
court acknowledged in this case that “general restrictions of law,
public order and morality . . . cannot be interpreted or used in such a
restrictive way as to curtail the basic essence and meaning of the preeminent right to religious conscience,” 37 the likelihood of the court
applying this principle to alleged blasphemy remains uncertain.
This Paper tackles the issue of public order concerns as applied to
religious speech. It argues that the United States was also worried
about public order early on in the development of its free speech
jurisprudence, but moved past it (the sections below on the U.S. law
demonstrate how and why). Because of these similar experiences,
U.S. history and jurisprudence provide useful guidance to nations
trying to balance between free speech protection and the
preservation of public order.
B. Similar Challenges in Other Muslim-majority Countries
Importantly, Pakistan is not alone in either its abuses or its use of
American court language to justify restricting speech in the name of
public order. 38 In the wake of the Arab Spring, other Muslim-

36. Id. at 17–21.
37. Id. at 18.
38. See, e.g., Jacey Fortin, Saudi Arabia Suggests Global Internet Regulations to Preserve
‘Public Order’, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.ibtimes.com/saudi-arabiasuggests-global-internet-regulations-preserve-public-order-845179. For example, when Saudi
Arabia recently pushed for greater Internet regulations, it did so because “there is a crying
need for international collaboration to address ‘freedom of expression,’ which clearly
disregards public order.” Id.
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majority countries are also looking to U.S. law as a source of
guidance. This Paper’s argument is thus applicable beyond the case
of Pakistan.
Tunisia provides one of the clearest examples. In June 2012,
extremist Muslims across the country rioted and the governing
Islamic party, Ennahda, 39 linked the riots to art displays and films
that allegedly disrespected Islam. 40 The government continued to
punish the artists. 41 In response, Ennahda proposed constitutional

39. Monica Marks, Speaking on the Unspeakable: Blasphemy and the Tunisian
J.
(Sept.
4,
2012),
Constitution,
SADA
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/04/speaking-on-unspeakable-blasphemy-tunisianconstitution/drca.
40. There were several examples of riots allegedly caused because of art displays and
films, including: 1) an art display in La Marsa. John Thorne, Books and Art Pit Freedom of
Religion Against Free Speech in Tunisia, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 17, 2012),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0817/Books-and-art-pit-freedomof-religion-against-free-speech-in-Tunisia/(page)/2; 2) Nadia El-Fani’s film, “No God, No
Master,” Persepolis Verdict Exposes Misuse of Blasphemy Laws in Tunisia, HUM. RTS. FIRST (May
04, 2012), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/persepolis-verdict-exposes-misuseblasphemy-laws-tunisia (drawing opposition simply because of the film’s title); 3) Andrew
Hammond, “No God” Film Angers Tunisian Islamists, REUTERS (Jul. 6, 2011, 9:25 AM),
http://www.reuters.com
/article/2011/07/06/ozatp-tunisia-islamists-tensionidAFJOE7650F320110706; and 4) Marjane Satrapi’s animated film, “Persepolis,” Marc
Fisher, Tunisian Court Finds Broadcaster Guilty in Showing God’s Image, WASH. POST (May 3,
2012) http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ tunisian-who-showed-persepolis-ontv-fined-in-free-speech-case/2012/05/03/gIQA0GpzyT_story.html
(outraging
some
Muslims because it portrayed God in human form with the Washington Post reporting that the
part of “Persepolis” in question involved God telling a “young girl to act in an honest and
forthright manner”).
41. The Tunisian government has persisted in prosecuting both the artists from La
Marsa and the TV station that aired “Persepolis.” In the latter, a trial court convicted the
station’s owner of causing “troubles to the public order” and “offence [sic] to good morals.”
Tunisian Court Fines TV Station Boss for Airing Animated Film Persepolis, GUARDIAN (May 3,
2012, 10:35 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/03/tunisian-court-tvstation-persepolis. He was fined the equivalent of $1,600, and two employees were fined the
equivalent of $800 each. See Fisher, supra note 40. The Tunisian court gave no explanation for
its decision. Id. Some Muslim clerics defended the charges because “the movie insulted Islamic
values by showing the face of God.” Id. Meanwhile, charges are still pending against Nadia
Jelassi and Mohamed Ben Salem, two sculptors involved in the La Marsa display, for disrupting
the public order. Tunisia: Hollande Should Raise Rights Concerns, HUM. RTS. WATCH,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/02/tunisia-hollande-should-raise-rights-concerns (last
updated July 1, 2013). As the same post goes on to note, there have also been prosecutions
and convictions for nonviolent speech, including a song called “Cops are Dogs,” accusing
officials of dereliction of duty in the decision to extradite the former Libyan prime minister,
calling on the defense minister to open an investigation against the director of a military
hospital, criticizing the general rapporteur of the legislature, and accusing a former foreign
minister of misuse of public funds. Id. By persisting with these prosecutions, Tunisia has
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provisions that would criminalize “all attacks on that which is
sacred,” 42 justifying them on the need for public order with some
even invoking the famous dictum from Schenck v. United States about
shouting “fire!” in a crowded theater. 43
However, the language was not adopted later 44 and Tunisia’s
newly ratified Constitution 45 instead has a vague clause that the
government “commits itself . . . to the protection of the sacred,”
suggesting that the State is still empowered to potentially outlaw

continued to misunderstand the public order exception to free speech even after dropping the
controversial constitutional provision.
42. See Marks, supra note 39. A proposed “Sacred Values” law would also have imposed
prison terms or fines for insulting or mocking the “sanctity of religion” and for “insults,
profanity, derision and representation of Allah and Mohammed.”Ennahda Proposes Blasphemy
Law in Tunisia, PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY BLOG (D.C.), pomed.org/blogpost/human-rights/blasphemy-law/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2015).
43. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The theory was that insults to Islam would produce
violence, so any affront to Islam should be punished. See Marks, supra note 39. Unfortunately,
although the language about shouting fire is more colorful than Brandenburg, that case is now
obsolete. As the history of the “clear and present danger” standard will reveal later in the
Paper, those words can be stretched to restrict a great deal of speech. The Brandenburg
standard, on the other hand, is remarkably protective of speech, strictly requiring imminence
and intent.
44. The bill and proposed constitutional provision were later withdrawn. In doing so,
National Constituent Assembly Speaker Mustapha Ben Jafaar explained: “[T]he sacred is
something very, very difficult to define. Its boundaries are blurred and one could interpret it in
one way or another, in an exaggerated way.” Tunisia Plans to Outlaw Blasphemy Dropped,
(Oct.
12,
2012,
9:30
PM),
TELEGRAPH
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/tunisia/9605965/Tuni
sia-plans-to-outlaw-blasphemy-dropped.html. Jafaar also commented that “freedom of
expression and of the press” were “a fundamental achievement of the revolution that should
never be called into question, and that no one should be able to challenge.” Id. The change
came on the heels of criticism from UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders,
Margaret Sekaggya, and other human rights groups. See, e.g., id.
45. Article 6 deals specifically with religious liberty:
The State is the guardian of religion. It guarantees liberty of conscience and of
belief, the free exercise of religious worship and the neutrality of the mosques and of
the places of worship from all partisan instrumentalization. The State commits itself
to the dissemination of the values of moderation and tolerance and to the protection
of the sacred and the prohibition of any offense thereto. It commits itself, equally, to
the prohibition of, and the fight against, appeals to Takfir [charges of apostasy] and
incitement to violence and hatred.
Amna Guellali, The Problem with Tunisia’s New Constitution, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 3,
2014),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/03/problem-tunisia-s-new-constitution
(quoting CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 2014, art. 6, available at
http://www.jasmine-foundation.org/doc/unofficial_english_translation_of_tunisian_constitut
ion_final_ed.pdf [hereinafter Constitution]).
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blasphemy. 46 But some argue that other provisions in the
Constitution will help balance against government overreach in this
area. 47 The Constitution also provides several protections for
freedom of expression, 48 but seeks to balance this freedom with the
prevention of violence. 49 Now, it will be up to the courts to
46. See Guellali, supra note 45 (“Article 6 attempts the impossible task of reconciling
two radically different visions of society. On the one hand, it caters to a hyper-religious
audience that sees the government as a watchdog and protector of all things sacred. At the
same time, the article describes a society that leaves each person the freedom of religious
choice, without intrusion or interference. The two irreconcilable visions are forced together in
a complicated and wordy fashion.”); Tunisia Signs New Constitution, GUARDIAN (Jan. 27,
2014, 10:38 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/tunisia-signs-newconstitution-progressive/print.
47. See Tunisia Signs New Constitution, supra note 46 (“‘This formulation [regarding
protecting the sacred] is vague and gives too much leeway to the legislators to trample other
rights such as the right to free expression, artistic creation and academic freedoms,’ said Amna
Guelleli, of the charity Human Rights Watch. ‘However, the risk is reduced given the strong
safeguards [in place in other articles] against overly broad interpretations.’”); Carlotta Gall,
Tunisian Constitution, Praised for Balance, Nears Passage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2014),
www.nytimes.com/
2014/01/15/world/africa/tunisian-constitution-praised-for-balancenears-passage.html?_r=1 (“But Mr. Fehri, the secular politician, said the balance was necessary.
‘Our opinion is different, so you have two explanations for the same thing,’ he said, referring
to an assembly member who is also an imam, who praised the first article from an Islamic point
of view. ‘So when it comes to interpretation, they will take both into account.’”). One article
even suggested that the text would potentially “permit atheism and the practice of nonAbrahamic religions frowned upon in other Islamic countries.” Tunisia Signs New
Constitution, supra note 46.
48. “Freedom of opinion, thought, expression, information and publication shall be
guaranteed. These freedoms shall not be subject to prior censorship.” CONSTITUTION, art. 31
(emphasis added). “The Audio-Visual Communication Commission shall . . . seek to
guarantee freedoms of expression and of the media and the existence of pluralistic and fair
media.” Id. art. 127 (emphasis added).
49. Article 6 contains “the first constitutional condemnation of takfir [calling someone
an apostate] in the Arab region.” Mohammad al-Hayat, Tunisia’s New Constitution
Criminalizes ‘Takfir’, AL-MONITOR (D.C.) (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/security/2014/02 /tunisia-new-constitution-bans-takfir.html#. Takfirs
are “religious edicts claiming someone is an apostate” that often lead to death threats and
assassination attempts on the person. Id. Some argue that this ban was unnecessary and
conflicts with freedom of expression. See Asma Ghribi, The Problem with Tunisia’s New
POL’Y
(D.C.)
(Jan.
9,
2014,
11:13
AM),
Constitution,
FOREIGN
http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/01/09/the_problem_with_tunisias_new_c
onstitution (“Constitutional expert Slim Loghmani said that Tunisia does not need to
criminalize apostasy because incitement to violence is already banned in the Tunisian penal
code. . . . This article [Article 6] limits the freedom of expression, because it fails to provide a
clear definition of apostasy, and does not specify whether apostasy is prohibited in all cases, or
only when it implies an incitement to violence. The opposition presents itself as a bulwark
against creeping Islamization and conservative attempts to curb liberties. But in their efforts to
prevent themselves from being dismissed as infidels, members of the secular opposition have
actually pushed for a provision that limits freedom of speech—specifically, the freedom of
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determine how to interpret this balance and they may look to the
United States for guidance.
Indonesia has also recently grappled with the same issue. 50 In
response to a 2010 case seeking the repeal of Indonesia’s Blasphemy
Act, 51 the country’s highest court—the Constitutional Court—
upheld the Act on public order grounds based on the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 52 The Indonesian
Blasphemy Act prohibits speech promoting “an interpretation of a
religion or a form of religious activity that is similar to the
interpretations or activities of an Indonesian religion but deviates
from the tenets of that religion.” 53 It also includes a criminal
prohibition on speech that “principally ha[s] the character of being
at enmity with, abusing or staining a religion adhered to in
Indonesia,” or expression with “the intention to prevent a person to
adhere to any religion based on the belief of the almighty God.” 54

speech for Islamists. The secularists did this by taking away the Islamists’ most powerful
rhetorical tool: religion.”); Sarah Mersch, Tunisia’s Compromise Constitution, SADA J. (D.C.)
(Jan. 21, 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/ 01/21/stunisia-s-compromiseconstitution/gyzc (“Protection of the sacred and the freedom of conscience and faith do not
go together—and neither do the interdiction against accusing somebody of apostasy and the
freedom of expression (guaranteed in article 30).”); See also CONSTITUTION, art. 35 (“The
freedom to establish . . . associations is guaranteed. . . . [A]ssociations must abide . . . by the
constitution, the law . . . and the rejection of violence.”); (“The law shall determine the
limitations related to the rights and freedoms that are guaranteed by this Constitution and their
exercise, on the condition that it does not compromise their essence. These limitations can only be
put in place where necessary in a civil democratic state, with the aim of protecting the rights of
others or based on the requirements of public order, national defense, public health or public morals.
Proportionality between these limitations and their motives must be respected. Judicial authorities
shall ensure that rights and freedoms are protected from all violations. No amendment that
undermines any human rights acquisitions or freedoms guaranteed in this Constitutions is
allowed.”) (emphasis added) Id. art. 49.
50. See Syamsul Arifin, Indonesian Discourse on Human Rights and Freedom of Religion
or Belief: Muslim Perspectives, 2012 BYU L. REV. 775, 808 (discussing that an Indonesian
Muslim party leader, Zallum, sees “freedom of religion [and] freedom of speech” as
“contradictory to Islam”).
51. See Decision No. 140/PUU-VII/2009, Indonesian Constitutional Court (April
19, 2010).
52. This was the primary international law instrument at issue in the case.
53. W. Cole Durham, Forward to THE LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTE, INDONESIA: A
RESOURCE GUIDE FROM THE LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTE iii (2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE
GUIDE], http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Indonesia-ResourceBook-Final-5-2011.pdf.
54. Id. at 134 (quoting Criminal Code of Indonesia art. 156(a) (internal
quotations omitted).
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The court’s opinion does not cite U.S. case law, but it does
grapple with public order exceptions in a way that invites
international comparison. The court used Article 19, paragraph
(3) which states that the right to freedom of expression “carries
with it special duties and responsibilities,” including restrictions
“[f]or the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public).” 55 The court also relied on Article 18 of the ICCPR,
which states that religious freedom “may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights
and freedoms of others.” 56 The court held that these treaties
justified the Blasphemy Act’s censure of religious interpretations
that “could trigger reactions that threaten security and public
order if [they are] expressed or practiced in public.” 57 In other
words, the government could limit blasphemous statements as a
means of preserving public order.
But the Indonesian court construed the public order exception
too broadly. The official commentary of the U.N. Human Rights
Committee explains that “[l]imitations . . . must be directly related
and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated.
Restrictions may not be . . . applied in a discriminatory manner.” 58
The Blasphemy Act is neither directly related nor proportionate to
the specific need at issue, and is not applied in a non-discriminatory
manner. It prohibits public communication of support for an
unofficial religion (i.e. not Islam, Protestant Christianity,
Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, or Confucianism), rather than
simply prohibiting communications on religious subjects that incite
individuals to violence. 59 And the Act’s officially acknowledged
purpose is to “channel . . . religiosity” towards the approved
religions, rather than to treat all religions equally. 60 The Indonesian
55. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 19 ¶ 3, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
56. Id. art. 18 ¶ 3.
57. Translation of Decision No. 140/PUU-VII/2009, Indonesian Constitutional
Court, [3.52] (April 19, 2010).
58. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22: Freedom of thought,
conscience or religion, art. 18, ¶ 8, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (July 30, 1993)
(emphasis added).
59. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 53, at 6.
60. Enactment of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 1/PNPS of 1965
Concerning the Prevention of Religious Abuse and/or Defamation, § I(3).
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court thereby misinterpreted the public order exception, conflating it
with blasphemy prohibitions and, in so doing, undeservedly
legitimized these prohibitions.
Because of these misunderstandings, it is important for policy
makers to be educated on the limits of the public order exceptions
and how they can be corrected. For Pakistan, this begins with
learning about its own development of laws on religious speech.
II. RELIGION IS DIFFERENT: PAKISTAN’S INCONSISTENT SPEECH
JURISPRUDENCE
As this Part will show, Pakistani courts have drawn heavily on the
old U.S. conception of public order exceptions to free speech in
interpreting its blasphemy laws. Yet these courts misunderstand the
U.S. standard and, more broadly, the public order exception in
international law.
A. Impact of General Zia Amendments
To better understand the Pakistani blasphemy laws in their
current state, it is helpful to compare Chapter 15 of the Pakistani
Penal Code, Of Offenses Relating to Religion, before and after
General Zia’s amendments in the 1980s. The table below
compares the language of the Penal Code before and after
General Zia’s amendments.
Penal Code Comparison: Pre & Post General Zia Amendments 61
Adopted Indian Penal Code
Section 295: Whoever destroys,
damages or defiles any place of
worship, or any object held sacred
by any class of persons with the
intention of thereby insulting the
religion of any class of persons or

General Zia Amendments
Section 295–B. Defiling, etc., of
Holy Qur’an: Whoever wilfully
[sic] defiles, damages or desecrates a
copy of the Holy Qur’an or of an
extract therefrom or uses it in any
derogatory manner or for any

61. Underlined words deal with mens rea. Italicized words deal with key aspects of
the text.
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with the knowledge that any
class of persons is likely to consider
such destruction, damage or
defilement as an insult to their
religion, shall be punished with
imprisonment
of
either
description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine,
or with both. 62
Section 298: Whoever, with the
deliberate intention of wounding
the religious feelings of any person,
utters any word or makes any
sound in the hearing of that
person or makes any gesture in
the sight of that person or places
any object in the sight of that
person, shall be punished with
imprisonment
of
either
description for a term which may
extend to one year, or with fine,
or with both. 64
Section 295–A: Whoever, with
deliberate
and
malicious
intention of outraging the
‘religious feelings of any class of
[the citizens of Pakistan], 66 by
words, either spoken or written,
or by visible representations,
insults or attempts to insult the
religion or the religious beliefs of

2015

unlawful purpose shall be punishable
with imprisonment for life.63

Section
295–C.
Use
of
derogatory remarks, etc., in
respect of the Holy Prophet:
Whoever by words, either spoken
or written, or by visible
representation
or
by
any
imputation,
innuendo,
or
insinuation, directly or indirectly,
defiles the sacred name of the Holy
Prophet Muhammad (peace be
upon him) shall be punished with
death, or imprisonment for life,
and shall also be liable to fine. 65
Section 298–B. Misuse of
epithets,
descriptions
and
titles, etc., reserved for certain
holy personages or places:
(1)
Any . . .
‘Ahmadis’ . . .
who . . . (a) refers to . . . any
person, other than a Caliph or
companion of the Holy Prophet
Muhammad . . . as “Ameer-ul-

62. The Penal Code Act, No. XLV of 1860, PEN. CODE (1860) ,ch. XV, § 295
(emphasis added) [hereinafter IPC].
63. Pakistan Penal Code Act, No. XLV of 1860, PAK. PEN. CODE (1982), ch. XV §
295–B, added by P.P.C. Ordinance, I of 1982 (emphasis added) [hereinafter PPC].
64. IPC ch. XV, § 298 (emphasis added).
65. PPC ch. XV § 295–C (emphasis added).
66. The phrase “citizens of Pakistan” replaced the Indian Penal Code’s phrase “His
Majesty’s subjects” by Adaption Order 1961, art. 2 (w.e.f. Mar. 23, 1956). See I PPC ch. XV §
295–A, n.2 (1982).
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that class, shall be punished with
imprisonment
of
either
description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine,
or with both. 67

Chapter 15 Preface: The
principle on which this chapter
has been framed is a principle on
which it would be desirable that
all Governments should act, but
from
which
the
British
Government in India cannot
depart without risking the
dissolution of society ; it is this,
that every man should be suffered
to profess his own religion, and
that no man should be suffered to
insult the religion of another. 69

Mumineen”,
“KhalifatulMumineen”,
“Khalifa-tulMuslimeen”, “Sahaabi” or “Razi
Allah Anho”;
(b) refers to . . . any person,
other than a wife of the Holy
Prophet
Muhammad . . .
as
“Ummul-Mumineen”;
(c) refers to . . . any person,
other than a member of the
family “Ahle-bait” of the Holy
Prophet
Muhammad . . .
as
“Ahle-bait”; or
(d) refers to . . . his place of
worship a “Masjid” shall be
punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term
which may extend to three years,
and shall also be liable to fine. 68
Section 298–C. Person of
Quadiani group, etc., calling
himself a Muslim or preaching
or propagating his faith:
Any . . .
‘Ahmadis’ . . .
who
directly or indirectly, poses himself
as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to,
his faith as Islam, or preaches or
propagates his faith, or invites
others to accept his faith, by
words, either spoken or written,
or by visible representations, or
in any manner whatsoever
outrages the religious feelings of
Muslims shall be punished with
imprisonment
of
either
description for a term which may

67. INDIA PEN. CODE, supra note 62, at 1328 (emphasis added).
68. PPC ch. XV § 298–B (emphasis added).
69. INDIA PEN. CODE AS ORIGINALLY FRAMED IN 1837, 136 (1888).
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extend to three years and shall
also be liable to fine. 70
Chapter 15 originated from the Indian Penal Code (XLV of
1860), which the British colonial government enacted for the Indian
subcontinent in October 1860. 71 As seen above in the preface to
Chapter 15, the Law Commissioner’s main motivation for its
inclusion in the Indian Penal Code was to maintain “order in a
multi-religious society” and prevent attacks targeting any religion. 72
Moreover, given the fact that Muslims formed a minority in the
Indian subcontinent prior to its partition, “it appears plausible that
part of the motivation for inclusion of this chapter was the
protection of religious rights of minorities.” 73 In a recent Lahore
High Court judgment, Justice Ali Nawaz Chohan corroborated this
view: “Historically speaking, [these laws were] enacted by the British
to protect the religious sentiments of the Muslim minorities in the
subcontinent before partition against the Hindu majority.” 74
However, while the drafters were specifically thinking of Islam,
they were doing so because of its status as a minority religion and
thus were making this law not only for the protection of Islam, but
also for any minority religion. 75 As seen in the table above, Sections
295 and 298 reflect these concerns. The language protects “any
person” 76 or “any class of persons,” 77 not just the majority religion,
and it does not discriminate against any religion. 78 In 1927, this
pattern continued with the insertion of Section 295-A by the
Criminal Law Amendment Act of XXV of 1927. 79 In their original
form, sections 295, 295–A and 298 of Chapter 15 were clearly
intended to apply to all religions. 80

70. PPC ch. XV sec. 298–C (emphasis added).
71. See Siddique & Hayat, supra note 8, at 336.
72. Id. at 337 (emphasis in original).
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Muhammad Mahboob v. State, (2002) 54 PLD (Lahore) 587,
597 (Pak.)).
75. Id.
76. PPC ch. XV § 295–C.
77. Id. at § 298.
78. Siddique & Hayat, supra note 8.
79. Id. at 338.
80. Id.

742

UDDIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

727

2/24/2016 9:17 PM

Free Speech and Public Order Exceptions

In contrast, and as will be described further below, the
blasphemy laws in their current form “pertain specifically to the
protection of Islam.” 81 For example, Section 295–B “pertains only to
the defilement of the Holy Quran.” 82 Section 295–C focuses
exclusively on “derogatory remarks against [the Prophet]
Muhammad.” 83 And Sections 298–B and 298–C deal exclusively
with the punishment of Ahmadis. 84
The Ahmadiyya is a minority religious group founded in the late
nineteenth century by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. 85 Ahmadis consider
themselves Muslims, although other Muslims disagree because of the
group’s variant belief about the finality of Prophet Muhammad’s
prophethood. 86 Anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment was relatively absent at
the time of Pakistan’s founding and Pakistan’s courts decided several
cases in favor of Ahmadi freedom of religion and speech in the
1960s. 87 But anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment has intensified in the years
since and was codified into law in the 1980s by General Zia-ul-Haq.
In particular, the 1983 Ordinance XX criminalized various forms of
Ahmadi worship and speech. 88 More than a thousand people have
been arrested under the blasphemy laws, forty percent of them
Ahmadi. 89 “Sections 298B and 298C of Pakistan’s Penal Code,
added in 1984 through Ordinance XX, are dedicated entirely to the

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 312.
86. Id. at 312 n.10.
87. See Abdur Rahman Mobashir v. Amir Ali Shah Bokhari, (1978) PLD (Lahore) 113
(Pak.) (holding “no law or legal right can be used to prevent Ahmadis from worshipping freely
and calling their house of worship a ‘masjid,’ religious terms are not property, and public
nuisance law cannot be used to punish Ahmadis for praying and reciting the call to prayer”);
Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri v. Province of West Pak., (1969) 21 PLD (Lahore) 289 (1968)
(Pak.) (holding freedom to profess Ahmadi religion is protected and civil courts cannot answer
who is Muslim).
88. See Ordinance No. XX of 1984The Gazette of Pakistan Islamabad, Thursday, 26
April 1984No.F.17(1)84-Pub, available at http://defence.pk/threads/ordinance-xx-thatbars-a-muslim-being-called-muslim-in-pakistan.379610/; see also PAKISTAN CONST. Pt XII,
ch.5 art. 260 (3)(b); PAKISTAN CONST. Pt XV, ch.5 art. 298-B, 298-C, available at
http://www.pakistani.org /pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html.
89. Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission: Hearing before H. Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 112th Cong., 3–4 (2012) (testimony of Amjad Mahmood Khan, Esq., UCLA Law
Professor), available at http://tlhrc.house.gov/docs/transcripts/2012_3_21_South%20Asia/
Amjad%20Khan%20 Testimony.pdf.
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persecution of Ahmadis,” prohibiting them from declaring their faith
publicly, calling themselves Muslims, building mosques, and
engaging in most other religious activities. 90
In comparing the Pakistani Penal Code’s original sections of
Chapter 15 and the current blasphemy laws as General Zia enacted
them in the 1980s, another fundamental difference is the elimination
of any intent requirement as a mens rea of the offense. 91
The 1860 and 1927 versions of the Indian Penal Code. . .
emphasize[d] the intention of the accused, as evidenced by the[]
inclusion of the following requirements in the relevant provisions”
of Section 295 and 298: “‘with the intention of thereby insulting
the religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge that any
class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or
defilement as an insult to their religion” in Section 295; “with the
deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious
feelings of any class of citizens of Pakistan” in Section 295–A; and
“with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of
any person” in Section 298. 92

However, General Zia’s amendments are nearly devoid of any
mens rea. 93 The only exception is section 295–B: “whoever wilfully
[sic] defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur’an.” 94
The new provisions in sections 295 and 298 fail to use any form of
mens rea: “by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or
indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet
Muhammad” 95 in Section 295–C (or of any family members “of the
Holy Prophet” in Section 298-A) 96; “Any . . . ‘Ahmadis’ . . . who . . .
refers to” 97 in Section 298–B; and “directly or indirectly, poses himself
as a Muslim, . . . or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious
feelings of Muslims” 98 in Section 298–C. 99 Thus, these amendments
90. Uddin, supra note 7, at 82; see also Syamsul Arifin, Indonesian Discourse on Human
Rights and Freedom of Religion or Belief: Muslim Perspectives, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 775, 777–78
(discussing the persecution of the Ahmadi faith in Indonesia).
91. Siddique & Hayat, supra note 8, at 340.
92. Id. (quoting IPC,ch. XV, §§ 295, 295–A, 298) (emphasis added).
93. See id. at 339–40.
94. PPC ch. XV § 295–B (emphasis added).
95. Id. § 295–C (emphasis added).
96. Id. § 298–A (emphasis added).
97. Id. § 298–B(2) (emphasis added).
98. Id. § 298–C (emphasis added).
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are based on strict liability, making it easier for the government to
prove that a person has committed blasphemy against Islam. 100
B. Case Comparison
Next, it is important to understand the differences in case law
before and after the Zia amendments. 101 The case of Punjab
Religious Book Society of Lahore v. State 102 exemplifies the Pakistan
Supreme Court’s understanding of Chapter 15’s “Offenses Relating
to Religion” intent requirement prior to General Zia’s enactment of
the blasphemy laws in the 1980s. 103 The Society had published a
book entitled “Mizan-ul-Haq” comparing Islam and Christianity,
which the Home Department declared was “calculated to outrage
the religious feelings of the Muslims of Pakistan and publication of
which is punishable under Section 295-A of the Pakistan Penal
Code.” 104 But the court disagreed. 105 Even though the court found
that the “[author’s] object was to show the superiority of
Christianity over Islam,” it also found that “he ha[d] said at more
places than one that he had no intention of injuring the feelings of
Muslims whom at places he called his brethren.” 106
The court’s reasoning hinges on the mens rea aspect of the
crime, not on the book’s potential effect on its readers. The court
held that this intent requirement “is not just the ordinary intention
that one finds mentioned with regard to almost all other offences
[sic] . . . but a deliberate and malicious intention to do the thing
mentioned therein.” 107 The court went on to note that the “laws of
Pakistan . . . do not forbid religious discussions and preaching,” so
if “a person engaged in a religious discussion is merely attempting
99. See Siddique & Hayat, supra note 8, at 340–41.
100. See id. at 337.
101. Many of these ideas come thanks to the great work of others. See id.
102. (1960) 12 PLD (Lahore) 629 (Pak.).
103. Siddique & Hayat, supra note 8, at 341–42.
104. Id. at 341 (quoting Punjab Religious Book Society v. State, (1960) 12 PLD
(Lahore) 629 (Pak.)).
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting Punjab Religious Book Society v. State, (1960) 12 PLD (Lahore) 629,
631 (Pak.)) (emphasis added); see also Muhammad Khalil v. State, (1962) 14 PLD (Lahore)
850 (Pak.) (addressing similar facts and confirming the same interpretation of Section 295–A’s
intent requirement).
107. Siddique & Hayat, supra note 8, at 341 (quoting Punjab Religious Book Society v.
State, (1960) 12 PLD (Lahore) 629, 637 (Pak.)).
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to show that the religion he is advocating is the best in the world,
he is not doing anything to which the law takes exception.” 108 The
court would only presume a deliberate and malicious intent when
the conduct of the accused “is extremely offensive and has no
reliable source to justify its acceptance as correct” or if the
“argument in favour [sic] of one religion has sunk to the level of
abuse to another.” 109
This initial emphasis on Chapter 15’s intent requirement and
general applicability to all religions is in stark contrast to the
blasphemy laws enacted under General Zia, which eliminated the
“deliberate and malicious” intent requirement, and focused
exclusively on offenses against Islam. 110 Additionally, and as will be
described further below, the blasphemy laws in their current form
“lack any nexus with the prerequisite of a causation of any breach of
peace, and in that sense are strict liability offenses.” 111
In 1993, the court handed down Zaheeruddin v. State, the major
case on freedom of speech and religion under the blasphemy laws in
their current form. 112 It upheld convictions under Ordinance XX and
section 295(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code by a three-to-two vote. 113
According to the Pakistani court, public religious expression by
Ahmadis was offensive to Pakistan’s other Muslim citizens and could
lead the offended citizens to engage in violence. 114 The court
reasoned that since Ahmadi practices can elicit such violent reactions,
the Pakistani government had the power to restrict the practices. 115
The majority opinion, written by Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry, based its
decision primarily on concerns about public order and drew heavily

108. Id. at 342 (quoting Punjab Religious Book Society v. State, (1960) 12 PLD
(Lahore) 629, 637–38 (Pak.)).
109. Id. (quoting Punjab Religious Book Society v. State, (1960) 12 PLD (Lahore) 629,
638 (Pak.)).
110. Id. at 343.
111. Id. at 337.
112. Id. at 374–75.
113. Zaheeruddin v. State, (1993) 26 SCMR 1718 (Pak.).
114. Amjad Mahmood Khan, Misuse and Abuse of Legal Argument by Analogy in
Transjudicial Communication: The Case of Zaheeruddin v. State, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. &
BUS. 497, 507–09 (2011). The court also spent a considerable portion of its opinion
discussing the applicability of copyright and trademark law to religious terminology, agreeing
that it does apply and does serve to prevent usage of these terms by non-Muslims. Id. at 509.
115. Id. at 509.
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on U.S. case law. 116 Among its citations were six U.S. Supreme Court
cases: 117 Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940); 118 Jones v. Opelika (1942); 119
Reynolds v. United States (1879); 120 Hamilton v. Board of Regents
(1934); 121 Cox v. New Hampshire (1941), 122 and Lanzetta v. New
Jersey (1939). 123 Of these, Cantwell and Jones are the most relevant.
The Cantwell citations generally invoked the U.S. Supreme
Court’s warning that freedom of religion does not allow individuals
to violate laws with impunity. The Pakistani court quoted the U.S.
Supreme Court as saying, “the cloak of religion or religious belief
does not protect anybody in committing fraud upon the public.” 124
The Zaheeruddin court also focused on the Cantwell Court’s
acknowledgement that:

116. Id.
117. Zaheeruddin, 26 SCMR 1718.
118. 310 U.S. 296.
119. 316 U.S. 584.
120. 98 U.S. 145. Reynolds, held, among other things, that a defendant could not violate
a law prohibiting polygamy because he considered it his religious duty. Id. Zaheeruddin uses
this case to support the proposition that, while laws cannot interfere with religious belief, they
can legitimately interfere with religious practice. Zaheeruddin, 26 SCMR at 25.
121. 293 U.S. 245. In Hamilton, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the government
does not violate religious freedom when it makes military training compulsory on a university
campus, despite students’ religious objections, because such training is essential to the
government duty to maintain peace and order. Id. at 256. But the law in question applied
equally to all university students of a certain age and did not explicitly target adherents of a
particular set of religious beliefs. In fact, the Supreme Court in Hamilton underscores its belief
in robust religious liberties: “Undoubtedly [religious liberty] does include the right to
entertain the beliefs, to adhere to the principles, and to teach the doctrines on which these
students base their objections to the order prescribing military training.” Id. at 262.
122. 312 U.S. 569. Cox involved the arrest of defendants Jehovah’s Witnesses for
marching near city hall with religious literature and signs without a license. The defendants
argued that the applicable statute, which prohibited a “parade or procession” on public streets
without a license, was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. The lower court held, and
the Supreme Court affirmed, that it was a traditional exercise of state power to regulate
parades and processions on public streets. The Court also held that the statute’s purpose was
not to restrict religious or free speech. Id. at 573–74.
123. 306 U.S. 451. Lanzetta is a case about the difference between vagueness and
overbreadth. Id. In a sad irony, however, Pakistan’s blasphemy law is often abused for its
vagueness. See FREEDOM HOUSE, POLICING BELIEF: THE IMPACT OF BLASPHEMY LAWS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, 73–74 (2010) (“Pakistan’s blasphemy laws are routinely used to exact
revenge, apply pressure in business or land disputes, and for other matters entirely unrelated
to blasphemy.”).
124. Zaheeruddin, 26 SCMR 1718. In reality, the Court wrote, “Nothing we have said is
intended even remotely to imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity,
commit frauds upon the public.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940).
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[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to
preserve the enforcement of that protection. . . . It is . . . clear that
a state may by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate
the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets,
and of holding meetings thereon; and may in other respects
safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the community,
without unconstitutionally invading [upon religious] liberties[.] 125

Although Cantwell clearly cautioned against misuse of the public
order argument to suppress a fundamental right, the Zaheeruddin
court cited Cantwell even as it “wholly den[ied Ahmadis’] right to”
religious expression. 126 Even setting aside the fact that Cantwell was
superseded in 1969 by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 127 the Pakistani court
failed to note that the decision actually upheld the Free Exercise
claim at issue. In the course of reaching its holding in Cantwell, the
U.S. Supreme Court wrote:
When clear and present danger of riot, disorder . . . or other
immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the
power of the state to prevent or punish is obvious. Equally
obvious is it that a state may not unduly suppress free
communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of
conserving desirable conditions. 128

A permissible law under Cantwell must therefore be tightly
drawn to strike at a “clear and present danger of” an “immediate
threat to public safety, peace, or order.” 129 The Zaheeruddin court
cited Cantwell to do precisely the reverse. By choosing the wrong
standard and then misapplying it, the Pakistani court managed to
reach the exact opposite result that a U.S. court would. Of course,
this misapplication may have been intentional; the court’s reliance on
U.S. law lent it legitimacy—even as the court contorted the very
meaning of the law.
The court also cited, third-hand, a Supreme Court case from
1942. Via a decision of the Indian Supreme Court, which in turn
quoted an Australian court decision, Justice Chaudhry wrote:

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
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The Supreme Court said in Jones v. Opelika, . . . with reference to
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of
press and freedom of religion: “They are not absolutes to be
exercised independently of other cherished privileges, protected by
the same organic instrument.” It was held that these privileges
must be reconciled with the right of a State to employ the
sovereign power to ensure orderly living “without which
constitutional guarantees of civil liberties would be a mockery.” 130

This time the Pakistani court was not ignoring the holding of the
U.S. case. But it did fail to explain that Jones v. Opelika was vacated
the next year on the authority of Murdock v. Pennsylvania. 131 In the
interim, Justice Byrnes had retired and been replaced by Justice
Rutledge. The new majority struck down solicitation restrictions on
free speech grounds, writing, “It does not cover, and petitioners are
not charged with, breaches of the peace. They are pursuing their
solicitations peacefully and quietly. Petitioners, moreover, are not
charged with or prosecuted for the use of language which is obscene,
abusive, or which incites retaliation.” 132 That language, of course,
would not have supported the Pakistani restriction.
C. Religious Speech vs. Other Speech
The Zaheeruddin decision also illustrates the growing disconnect
between the blasphemy laws in Pakistan as the courts are currently
interpreting them, and the rest of the courts’ free speech
jurisprudence. First, it is important to understand the relevant text of
the Pakistani Constitution protecting both free speech and religious
freedom. Article 19 guarantees freedom of speech:
Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and
expression, and there shall be freedom of the press, subject to any
reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory
of Islam or the integrity, security or defence [sic] of Pakistan or any
part thereof, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,
decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court,
commission of or incitement to an offence [sic]. 133

130. Zaheeruddin, 26 SCMR 1718 (quoting Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584,
593 (1942)).
131. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
132. Id. at 116 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
133. PAKISTAN CONST., art. 19.
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And Article 20 protects the freedom to profess religion:
Subject to law, public order and morality, — (a) every citizen shall
have the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion; and
(b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have
the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious
institutions. 134

In its non-religious speech cases, Pakistan has taken the general
approach of its Article 19 case law by considering the intent of the
speaker and the imminence of the threat to public order as essential
elements of the analysis. For example, in the contempt of the court
case of Syed Masroor Ahsan v. Ardeshir Cowasjee, the court noted that
in the United States:
[T]he vehemence of the language used is no longer alone the
measure of power to punish for contempt, but the deciding factor
is whether it constitutes imminent, not merely likely, threat to the
administration of justice and that the danger must not be remote
or even probable, it must immediately imperil. 135

Similarly, during the constitutional crisis and conflict between
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in
1993, the Supreme Court became involved and held that the
president could dissolve the National Assembly only if a
constitutional breakdown had occurred. In assessing allegations of
treason leveled against Prime Minister Sharif by President Ishaq
Khan, Justice Saleem Akhtar had occasion to remark:
The danger should “imminently threaten immediate interference
with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law” requiring
immediate step [sic] to ensure security of the country. . . . The
concept of “clear and present danger” in [sic] USA was liberalised
[sic] by making “imminence” as [sic] a basic test.
. . . If such a speech makes allegation [sic] or defames anyone
without any justification, but does not create lawlessness, disorder,

134. Id. art. 20 §§ a–b.
135. Syed Masroor Ahsan v. Ardeshir Cowasjee, (1998) 50 PLD (SC) 823 (Pak.) (citing
Craig v. Harney 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)).
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or threat to security or disruption, it will hardly amount to
subversion of the Constitution. 136

The contrast between the Pakistan Supreme Court’s uses of U.S.
free speech jurisprudence in the case of Nawaz Sharif v. President of
Pakistan and in the case of Zaheeruddin v. State could not be more
striking. This is particularly curious given the two opinions were
issued in the same year. While the court focused on the imminence
and immediacy of the threat to the public order when assessing
Nawaz Sharif’s free speech rights, the court in Zaheeruddin not only
neglected addressing the imminence of any threat to the public
order, but it also completely failed to consider the Ahmadi’s free
speech rights under Article 19. 137 In this regard, it is clear that the
court’s blasphemy law jurisprudence has been completely unmoored
from the court’s free speech jurisprudence. Not only has the
necessary prerequisite of intent been eliminated from the statutory
offenses in Chapter 15, the requirement of demonstrating an
imminent threat to the public order has been eliminated from the
court’s analysis as well.
As will be discussed further in Parts IV and V below, in the
United States, laws limiting hateful speech require a showing that “a
violent reaction and a resultant breach of the peace” is imminent, in
order for the speech to be constitutionally restricted. 138 The speech’s
mere prejudicial effect or offensiveness is not sufficient to subject it
to restriction. 139 In contrast, Pakistan’s blasphemy laws in their
current form do not require a connection between the offensive
speech and an imminent breach of the peace. “Not only do these
laws not require a nexus between intent and action, they also do not
require a nexus between action and outcome.” 140
Moreover, even in those cases where Pakistani courts discuss
whether the impugned speech is likely to provoke a breach of the
peace, there is “not a single instance” where the freedom of speech
guaranteed by Article 19 of the Pakistan Constitution is invoked,
nor is there a discussion of whether it has a role to play in the
136. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan, (1993) 45 PLD 473 § 20 (Pak.)
(quoting Saia v. N.Y., 334 U.S. 558 (1948)) (citing Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382 (1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. See Siddique & Hayat, supra note 8, at 375–76.
138. Id. at 373.
139. Id.
140. Id.

751

UDDIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/24/2016 9:17 PM

2015

analysis. 141 On the rare occasion that the blasphemy laws are
challenged on constitutional grounds, Pakistan has been quick and
“categorical in rejecting such arguments.” 142 In this respect, the
Zaheeruddin opinion is a rare example of the court “conducting a
cost-benefit analysis of the” fundamental rights and “freedoms
enshrined [in] the Constitution [albeit Article 20’s protection of
freedom of religion instead of Article 19’s protection of freedom of
speech] vis-à-vis [the] public policy” concern with preventing a
“breach of the peace.” 143
Generally speaking, since General Zia’s Islamization efforts,
Pakistan’s blasphemy law jurisprudence and free speech
jurisprudence have become completely disconnected. Principles, such
as intent and imminence, that made general free speech restrictions
unconstitutional under Article 19, have been completely ignored
when determining the constitutionality of religious speech under
Article 20. 144 This is unusual, given the fact that prior to the
enactment of the blasphemy laws in their current form, Pakistani
courts looked at both the intent of the speaker and the imminence of
the threat to public order when deciding whether religious speech
violated Chapter 15 of the PPC—just as the court did in Punjab
Religious Books Society. 145
As will be discussed more fully below in Part IV, Pakistan can
benefit from the example of U.S. free speech jurisprudence. In many
ways, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has been wrestling for some
time with the incorporation of the U.S. standard into its Article 19
case law. But what is ironic is that while the U.S. standard of intent
and imminence of violence is being incorporated into Pakistan’s free
speech jurisprudence, the requirements of intent and imminence are
simultaneously being eliminated from Pakistan’s blasphemy law
jurisprudence. This discrepancy suggests that Pakistan’s misuse of
U.S. law in the blasphemy context may be intentional.

141. Id. at 374.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 375.
144. Id. at 375–76.
145. Id. at 341 (quoting Punjab Religious Book Society v. State, (1960) 12 PLD
(Lahore) 629, 631 (Pak.)).
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D. OIC Defamation of Religions Resolution and Resolution 16/18
The debate over the “defamation of religions” at the UN
provides another example of U.S. free speech laws’ influence in the
international context—and Pakistan’s rejection of those principles as
applied to religious speech. In 1999, Pakistan was at the forefront of
an effort by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to pass
a resolution in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights on the
Defamation of Religions. 146 Pakistan presented the draft resolution as
a solution for rising intolerance toward Muslims in the West, which
Pakistan likened to anti-Semitic violence in Europe prior to World
War II. 147
Other delegates thought the Resolution was unbalanced and
criticized its sole focus on Islam, arguing that adherents of other
religions were also discriminated against and subject to intolerance
and persecution. Pakistan’s delegate agreed to change the title and
paragraph 3 of the Resolution to make it inclusive of all religions,
while the text continued to reflect Pakistan’s concerns regarding
the treatment of Islam specifically. 148 In 1999 and 2000, the
resolution was adopted without a vote after these changes and

146. Asma T. Uddin, The UN Defamation of Religions Resolution and Domestic
Blasphemy Laws: Creating a Culture of Impunity, in FREE SPEECH AND CENSORSHIP AROUND
THE GLOBE 495 (Peter Molnar ed., 2015).
147. See U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., 61st mtg. at ¶¶ 1–9, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/SR.61 (Oct. 19, 1999).
148. U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., 62d mtg. at ¶¶ 1–9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/SR.62
(Nov. 17, 1999).
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comments. 149 From 1999 until 2005, the Commission adopted
similar resolutions annually. 150
A well-known example of the “defamation of religion” claim
came after the publication of twelve cartoons of the Prophet
Mohammed in a Danish newspaper in 2005. The culture editor of
the newspaper subsequently explained his decision:
When I visit a mosque, I show my respect by taking off my shoes. I
follow the customs, just as I do in a church, synagogue or other
holy place. But if a believer demands that I, as a nonbeliever,
observe his taboos in the public domain, he is not asking for my
respect, but for my submission. And that is incompatible with a
secular democracy. 151

The OIC, however, issued a press release in 2005 criticizing
“the recent incident of desecration of the image of the Holy
Prophet Mohamed” and “using the freedom of expression as a
pretext to defame religions.” 152 This incident illustrates the disparity
between public order exceptions and the defamation of religions

149. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on the Sixty-First Sess., 2005/3, at 21, Mar. 14–
Apr. 22, 2005, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/135, Supp. No. 3 (2005); Comm’n on Human
Rights, Rep. on the Sixtieth Sess., 2004/6, at 28, Mar. 15–Apr. 23, 2004, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2004/127, Supp. No. 3 (Apr. 13, 2004); Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on the
Fifty-Ninth Sess., 2003/4, at 34, Mar. 17–Apr. 24, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/135,
Supp. No. 3 (2003); Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on the Fifty-Eighth Sess., 2002/9, at
56, Mar. 18–Apr. 26, 2002, U.N. No. E/CN.4/2002/200, Supp. No. 3 (2002); Comm’n on
Human Rights, Rep. on the Fifty-Seventh Sess., at 47, Mar. 19–Apr. 27, 2001, U.N. No.
E/CN.4/2001/167, Part II (Apr. 27, 2001); Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2000/84,
Defamation of Religions, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Res/2000/84, at 336 (Apr. 26,
2000); Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on the Fifty-Sixth Sess., 2000/84, Mar. 20–Apr. 28,
2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/167, Supp. No. 3 (2000); Comm’n on Human Rights, Res.
1999/82, Report on the 55th Sess., Mar. 22–Apr. 30, 1999, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/167,
at 280 (Apr. 30, 1999); Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on the Fifty-Fifth Sess., Mar. 22–
April 30, 1999, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/167, Supp. No. 3 (1999).
150. G.A. Res. 60/150, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/150 (Dec.
16, 2005); G.A. Res. 61/164, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/164 (Dec.
19, 2006); G.A. Res. 62/154, U.N. GAOR, 62d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/154 (Dec.
18, 2007); G.A. Res 63/171, U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/171 (Dec.
18, 2008).
151. Flemming Rose, Why I Published Those Cartoons, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 19, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021702499_2.html.
152. Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century,
Solidarity in Action, Final Communique of the Third Extraordinary Session of the Islamic
Summit Conference, art. 2, ¶ 11(Dec. 7−8, 2005), http://www.oic-oci.org/exsummit/english/fc-exsumm-en.htm.
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slogan, as well as the OIC’s application of “defamation of
religions” only to Islam.
The Defamation of Religions Resolution was long criticized as a
cover for domestic blasphemy laws. Over the years, the resolution
began to lose popularity among delegates. 153 In early 2011, two
prominent Pakistani politicians were killed for opposing Pakistan’s
blasphemy laws. 154 The murders focused attention on the
problematic concept of “Defamation of Religions” and its
association with domestic blasphemy laws. As a result, the United
States and other states opposed to the defamation concept worked
with the OIC on a new resolution that dropped the “defamation”
term entirely and replaced it with “vilification.” 155
In March of 2011, delegates passed U.N. Human Rights
Council Resolution 16/18, completely removing the defamation
language and replacing the title with, “Combating intolerance,
negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination,
incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on
religion or belief.” 156 Operative Clause 2 states that the Human
Rights Council:
[e]xpresses its concern that incidents of religious intolerance,
discrimination and related violence, as well as of negative
stereotyping of individuals on the basis of religion or belief,
continue to rise around the world, and condemns, in this context,
any advocacy of religious hatred against individuals that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, and urges States
to take effective measures, as set forth in the present resolution,
consistent with their obligations under international human rights
law, to address and combat such incidents. 157

153. Uddin, supra note 146.
154. Jane Perlez, Extremists Are Suspected in Killing of Pakistani Minister, INT’L N.Y. TIMES (MAR. 2,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/world/asia/03pakistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
155. Uddin, supra note 146, at 501–02.
156. Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, Res. adopted by the Human Rights Council:
Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination,
incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief, 16th Sess.,
Feb. 28–Mar. 11, 2011, U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., A/HRC/RES/16/18 (March 24, 2011).
157. Id.
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Operative Clause 5(f) further calls for governments to “[a]dopt[]
measures to criminalize incitement to imminent violence based on
religion or belief.” 158
Those words echo the U.S. standard as announced in
Brandenburg v. Ohio. 159 The State Department has praised the
resolution on multiple occasions, no doubt because the formal
language matches the Supreme Court’s standard so neatly. 160 The
OIC’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Ufuk
Gokcen, actually wrote in a 2012 op-ed:
We moved away from the anti-defamation language of the previous
OIC sponsored resolutions to a clearer acceptance of freedom of
expression and focused on upholding the rights of the individuals
against discrimination in an effort to foster international
cooperation. Using much of the United States First Amendment
language, Resolution 16/18 promotes respect for and protection
of the individual rights of all people. 161

Both the OIC and the State Department thus see 16/18 as more
consistent with U.S. standards than the old “Defamation of
Religions” resolution.
Despite widespread agreement on Resolution 16/18, Pakistan
continues to maintain that its original resolution on defamation of
religions is still necessary and valid. In introducing Resolution
16/18, Pakistan’s OIC ambassador said, “I want to state
categorically that this resolution does not replace the OIC’s earlier
resolutions on combatting defamation of religions which were
adopted by the Human Rights Council and continue to remain

158. Id.
159. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
160. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Joint Statement on Combating
Intolerance, Discrimination, and Violence Based on Religion or Belief (July 15, 2011)
[hereinafter
Joint
Statement],
available
at
http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168653.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Esther Brimmer,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Int’l Org. Affairs, Remarks on U.S. Priorities at Opening of UN
22
(Feb.
26,
2013),
available
at
Human
Rights
Council
http://www.state.gov/p/io/rm/2013/205203.htm.
161. Ufuk Gokcen, The Reality of Freedom of Expression in the Muslim World, THE HILL
CONG. BLOG (Oct. 19, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreignpolicy/262855-the-reality-of-freedom-of-expression-in-the-muslim-world; see also Joint
Statement, supra note 160.
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valid.” 162 He later told a reporter that all sides made concessions, but
the OIC would never compromise on “anything against the
Quran, . . . the Prophet, and . . . the Muslim community in terms of
discrimination.” 163 Other OIC representatives offered similar
statements confirming Pakistan’s view of the Resolution and refuting
the permanent representative’s position. 164
This dispute over interpretation may have been due to the
vagueness of 16/18’s language. Partly to deal with this problem,
the U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Right to Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, other experts, and national representatives
developed the Rabat Plan of Action in 2012. 165 The Rabat Plan is a
series of recommendations about the implementation of the
international prohibition on incitement to hatred. 166 Among other
things, it recommended that states repeal blasphemy laws. 167 It also
urged courts to consider the context, speaker, intent, content, and
extent of speech, as well as the “likelihood, including imminence”
of violence. 168
Yet, while the UN reported that Pakistan’s OIC Representative
said in early 2014 that “[t]he Rabat Plan of Action was useful in
162. Robert C. Blitt, Defamation of Religion: Rumors of Its Death Are Greatly
Exaggerated, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 347, 362–63 (2011) (citing Zamir Akram, Permanent
Representative of Pak. to the U.N. Office at Geneva, Remarks at the 16th Session, 46th Plenary
Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Mar. 24, 2011) (emphasis added), available at
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixteenth/hrc110324pm2eng.rm? start=00:39:20&end=00:49:44).
163. Maha Akeel, A Roadmap for Implementing UNHRC Resolution on Combating
Religious Intolerance, OIC J., June–Aug. 2011, at 4, 5, available at http://www.oicoci.org/oicv2/journal/?lan=en. He went on to say that Islamic countries have a religious duty
to protect religious minorities, even though he felt that none of them are “deliberately
discriminating against [these] minorities.” Id. He added that most countries “have strong laws
against religious discrimination,” but need to implement them. Id. He finished by saying, “At
the same time we are asking for protection of Muslims living in the West, we must also be
prepared to give the same treatment of minorities living in Muslim countries.” Id.
164. Blitt, supra note 162 at 362–64. This paper also highlights statements from the
United States and other nations that ignore the statements of the OIC member nations. Id.
165. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Between Free Speech and Hate
Speech: The Rabat Plan of Action, a Practical Tool to Combat Incitement to Hatred (February 21, 2013),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/TheRabatPlanofAction.aspx.
166. Id.
167. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rabat Plan of Action on the
Prohibition of Advocacy of National, Racial, or Religious Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to
Discrimination, Hostility or Violence (October 5, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Issues/Opinion/SeminarRabat/Rabat_draft_outcome.pdf.
168. Id. at 6.
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balancing freedom of expression and incitement to hatred or
violence,” 169 Pakistan has not embraced the approach in recent
blasphemy cases. Even as it has paid lip service to Rabat Plan
principles—and even as it has applied the principles in non-religious
speech cases—Pakistan is careful not to let these discussions affect its
ability to keep and enforce its blasphemy laws. Thus, Pakistan
continues to resist the international consensus.
In sum, Pakistan has insisted on treating religious speech
differently than other speech; in particular, Pakistan, concerned
about the public order ramifications of controversial religious speech,
has failed to apply principles such as intent and imminence in its
post-General Zia blasphemy law cases. This treatment of religious
speech has led to widespread human rights abuses.
One way to address Pakistan’s selective treatment of religious
speech is to delve deeper into the U.S. law Pakistan purports to rely
on and look to it for guidance. This Paper accomplishes this by
looking at the reasons the United States shifted its approach to
controversial speech. It will then demonstrate the relevance of the
U.S. trajectory to Pakistan. Finally, it will discuss implementation of
the U.S. standard in the Pakistani context.
III. THE MIS-RECEPTION OF THE U.S. STANDARD
The current American test for restricting speech on the grounds
of public order was announced in Brandenburg v. Ohio. 170 In a per
curiam opinion, the Court wrote, “[T]he constitutional guarantees
of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” 171 The
Court continued by holding that “the mere abstract teaching . . . of
the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and
violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and
steeling it to such action.” 172 There are thus three components:
169. U.N. Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Council
Starts Dialogue with Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Religion and on Human Rights and CounterTerrorism (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?
NewsID=14352&LangID=E.
170. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
171. Id. at 447.
172. Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961)).
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incitement (as opposed to “mere advocacy”), 173 intent to incite, 174
and objective likelihood that violence is imminent. 175
Before looking closer at these factors, it is important to
distinguish between incitement and “fighting words.” Whereas
incitement is intended to rouse the listener to violence against a third
party, fighting words are intended to insult the listener. As the U.S.
Supreme Court explained in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the
leading case on fighting words:
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute
at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech . . . . These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or “fighting” words—those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. “Resort to
epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no
question under that instrument.” 176

Chaplinsky held that “the appellations ‘damned racketeer’ and
‘damned Fascist’ are epithets likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.” 177 Importantly,
American courts consider insults to a listener to be different from
incitement to violently strike at a third party, with Chaplinsky
governing the former and Brandenburg governing the latter. In
many ways, this is the most important distinction between U.S.
incitement law and the Pakistani laws: incitement requires a thirdparty reaction, not simply what Professor Robert C. Post has called
“provocation” that makes a speaker’s audience “so outraged that it

173. Id. at 449.
174. Id. at 447.
175. Id.
176. 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
309, 310 (1940)) (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 574.
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[feels] compelled to riot and commit mayhem.” 178 In many (though
not all) cases, when judges and officials in these countries talk about
“public order,” they really ought to be using the different concept of
“fighting words.”
Of course, this raises the question: if “fighting words” is an
unprotected category of speech, and if blasphemous statements are
considered “fighting words” in different cultural contexts, would
blasphemy laws be justified under U.S. free speech law? The answer
is no—for several reasons.
From a legal perspective, while fighting words is a category of
speech not protected by the First Amendment, every time the U.S.
Supreme Court has opined on a case involving fighting words, it has
reversed the conviction, even if it has not overruled Chaplinsky. 179
The Court has used three different avenues to overturn the
convictions and narrow the fighting-words doctrine. 180 The first way
is by ruling that the doctrine only applies to speech that is directed
to another person and is likely to produce a violent response. 181 The
second way, which the Court uses more frequently, is by ruling that
the laws prohibiting fighting words are either unconstitutionally
overbroad or vague. 182 Third, the Court has made clear that laws that
prohibit only some fighting words, for example hateful speech that is
based on race or gender, are content-based restrictions, which are
also impermissible. 183
For example, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, a Minnesota local
ordinance in St. Paul prohibited placing symbols, objects, or
graffiti, including a burning cross or Nazi swastika on any public or
private property which would arouse anger on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion, or gender. 184 The Supreme Court held this
ordinance unconstitutional because it was content-based, that is, it
prohibited only those fighting words that were based on race,

178. Robert C. Post, Free Speech in the Age of YouTube, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 2012),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/17/free-speech-in-the-age-of-youtube/.
179. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1002
(3d ed. 2006).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1005.
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color, creed, religion or gender. 185 By so holding, the Court made it
very unlikely that a law banning fighting words would ever be
upheld. If the law is narrow, the Court will most likely hold that it
is unconstitutionally content-based, and if it is broad, then it will
be held overbroad and vague. 186
These restrictions help explain why blasphemy should not be
treated akin to fighting words. Blasphemy laws are inherently vague
and overbroad—even broader than the broadest set of fighting
words. 187 Blasphemy is also inherently subjective, often depending on
individual proclivities: How is one supposed to know whether, for
example, a Christian preacher teaching beliefs variant from the
dominant religion will enrage people, especially those outside of his
congregation—that is, members of an unintended audience? Basic
principles of statutory construction hold that a law is overly vague if
a reasonable person cannot tell whether the law prohibits his or her
actions or not. 188 Blasphemy laws would clearly fall under this
category. Blasphemy laws also constitute content-based prohibitions,
as they prohibit only religion-based claims, and moreover, privilege
some religious claims over others.
Turning back to the Brandenburg standard, the Supreme Court
reads “imminence” narrowly. Four years after Brandenburg, the
Supreme Court explained in Hess v. Indiana what did not amount to
an imminent threat. 189 Gregory Hess had been convicted of
disorderly conduct for saying either “We’ll take the fucking street
later” or “We’ll take the fucking street again” at an anti-war
demonstration. 190 The Supreme Court concluded:
[S]ince there was no evidence, or rational inference from the
import of the language, that his words were intended to produce,
and likely to produce, imminent disorder, those words could not
be punished by the State on the ground that they had “a ‘tendency
to lead to violence.’” 191

185. Id.
186. Id. at 1002.
187. See LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED,
FROM MOSES TO SALMAN RUSHDIE 523 (1993).
188. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 179, at 941.
189. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
190. Id. at 107.
191. Id. at 108–09 (quoting Hess v. State, 297 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Ind. 1973)).
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The U.S. Supreme Court therefore requires violence to be
within a very limited timeframe. To return to the example of the
Danish cartoons of Mohammed, violent protests several months after
the publication date would not count as “imminent.” 192
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the American
conception of “public order” is a narrower concept than the
international idea of “l’ordre public,” borrowed from the French. As
a result, the definition of the American public order exception itself
is narrower than the French and international one:
[T]he English expression “public order” [is] not equivalent to––
and indeed [is] substantially different from––the French expression
l’ordre public (or the Spanish expression orden público). In civil law
countries l’ordre public is a legal concept used principally as a basis
for negating or restricting private agreements, the exercise of police
power or the application of foreign law. In common law countries
the expression “public order” is ordinarily used to mean the
absence of public disorder. The common law counterpart of l’ordre
public is “public policy” rather than “public order”. 193

Accordingly, an imminent threat to l’ordre public may not be
recognized as an imminent threat under the U.S. courts’ public
order exception.
An explication of this sort by policymakers is possible, and may
well have an impact, because it is the Pakistani courts that, in the
first instance, relied on U.S. free speech law. If Pakistani courts had
not looked to the United States for guidance, such a dialogue
would likely be interpreted as cultural imposition. And despite
fundamental cultural differences between the United States and
Pakistan, Pakistan’s reliance on U.S. case law suggests room for
common ground.

192. Of course, the cartoons also did not count as “incitement” because the violence
resulted from insult felt by certain Muslims, not instructions to attack a third party. There was
certainly incitement in that case, but it was on the part of irresponsible leaders who called on
Muslims to carry out violence against the newspaper, the cartoonists, and other targets.
193. International Covenants on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 833 (IX), Annex, U.N.
GAOR, 10th Sess., Agenda item 28, Part II, U.N. Doc. No. A/2929 ch. VI, art. 18, at ¶ 113
(July 1, 1955).
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IV. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
While the current U.S. doctrine should be a model for other
countries, this was not always the case. There is no single
explanation of why the United States rejected its earlier speechrestrictive jurisprudence. But as modern liberalism and
libertarianism came to prominence—with their skepticism of
government, censorship, and commitment to democratic
processes—the Court eventually moved from the restrictive “bad
tendency” test to the Brandenburg standard.
A. From Bad Tendency to “Clear and Present Danger”
In eighteenth-century America, free speech protections were
much closer to the state of affairs today in Pakistan. Blackstone
believed that “blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical,
seditious, or scandalous libel[ous]” speech could all be prohibited. 194
There was certainly some support for free speech. As one historian
suggests, “[T]he actual practice of the American people reveals a
society in which people certainly valued—and took for granted—the
ability to read the news and opinion of others, as well as speak their
minds on most subjects.” 195 In some circles, the famous line from
Cato’s Letters about free speech as “the great Bulwark of liberty”
held sway. 196 And when the Americans set about writing state
constitutions during the Revolution, nine protected freedom of the
press. But only Pennsylvania protected “freedom of speech” itself. 197
Furthermore, when political tensions worsened at the close of the
eighteenth century, the federal government passed the now-infamous
Sedition Act to punish certain speech. 198

194. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151.
195. Stewart Jay, The First Amendment: The Creation of the Right to Free Expression:
From the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773,
784 (2008).
196. Id. at 785 (quoting J EFFERY A. S MITH , P RINTERS AND P RESS F REEDOM :
T HE I DEOLOGY OF E ARLY A MERICAN J OURNALISM 25 (1988) (citing J OHN
T RENCHARD & W ILLIAM G ORDON , C ATO ’ S L ETTERS : E SSAYS ON L IBERTY , C IVIL AND
R ELIGIOUS 99 (1724))).
197. Id. at 787.
198. The Sedition Act of 1798, Fifth Congress; Enrolled Acts and Resolutions; available
at http://constitution.org/rf/sedition_1798.htm.
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Even after the repudiation of the Sedition Act, the speechrestrictive “bad tendency” test remained dominant in the nineteenth
century and the early twentieth century. The test allows the State to
“retain[] the right to punish speech that tended, even remotely, to
encourage violations of the law.” 199 As stated by none other than
Justice Holmes in 1907, the First Amendment did not prevent
“punishment of such [speech] as may be deemed contrary to the
public welfare.” 200 But four cases in 1919 ultimately initiated a new
era. The first three merely planted a seed of speech protection. In
Schenck v. United States, Justice Holmes first used his now-famous
phrase “clear and present danger.” 201 In Frohwerk v. United States 202
and Debs v. United States, 203 Holmes again wrote for the Court and
cited Schenck. Of course, all four cases rejected the free speech
challenge being brought before the Court.
Only in the fourth case, Abrams v. United States, did Justice
Holmes use his “clear and present danger” test to protect speech in
his famous dissent, joined by Justice Brandeis. 204 In particular,
Holmes interpreted his phrase to require more immediacy and intent
than the majority did. 205 He wrote:
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that
would justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States
constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to
produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about
forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States
constitutionally may seek to prevent. 206

He continued by reading the immediacy requirement strictly: “It is
only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it
about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of

199. Thomas L. Haskell, Redrawing the Boundaries of Permissible Speech, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 807, 809 (1999) (quoting DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN
YEARS 175 (1997)).
200. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
201. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
202. 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
203. 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919).
204. 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 627–28.
206. Id. at 627.
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opinion where private rights are not concerned.” 207 Later in the
dissent, he also stressed the necessity of intent. 208 Although the
Abrams dissent was not as strict as Brandenburg, Justice Holmes had
begun the process of requiring both immediacy and intent.
Among legal scholars, there is something of a pastime in
explaining Justice Holmes’s apparent switch in 1919. One common
theory is that the facts in the first three cases were different from the
facts in Abrams. 209 The excesses of the Red Scare of 1919 and 1920,
after the war’s end, may have further encouraged Justices Holmes
and Brandeis to dissent. 210 Another common explanation is that
Holmes and Brandeis fell under the influence of libertarian
academics, especially Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr. 211
What is most important for the purposes of today’s
jurisprudence, however, is the new theory of the First Amendment
espoused in these dissents. Justices Holmes and Brandeis were
skeptical of government’s ability to censor harmful ideas short of
those that imminently threaten evil. 212 Instead, they proposed a kind
of marketplace of ideas, in which correct ideas would ultimately
triumph. Holmes wrote in Abrams:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their

207. Id. at 628.
208. Id. (citing Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905)).
209. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 619–20; David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1312 (1983).
210. See Jay, supra note 195, at 845 (noting that Abrams was handed down just three
days after the first Palmer Raid).
211. Rabban, supra note 209, at 1303, 1345; see also Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S.
466, 486 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (referencing the work of Professor Chafee).
212. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“While that experiment is
part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law
that an immediate check is required to save the country.”) (emphasis added).
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wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of
our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. 213

Based on that theory, Justice Holmes phrased his standard
as follows:
I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to
check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be
fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that
an immediate check is required to save the country. 214

The decisions in the Brandenburg era would later enshrine the same
theory of free debate eventually leading to truth. 215
There was also an emerging majoritarian democratic argument in
the Holmes-Brandeis dissents. As Justice Holmes wrote in Gitlow v.
New York (1925), “[i]f in the long run the beliefs expressed in
proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant
forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they
should be given their chance and have their way.” 216 In Whitney v.
California (1927), Justice Brandeis’s concurrence specifically made
democracy about deliberation. He wrote, “[t]hose who won our
independence believed that the final end of the State was to make
men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.” 217 Brandeis
quoted Jefferson 218 and attributed to the Founders collectively a
belief that “[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced

213. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 338
(1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“In frank expression of conflicting opinion lies the greatest
promise of wisdom in governmental action; and in suppression lies ordinarily the greatest
peril.”); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 273 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The
fundamental right of free men to strive for better conditions through new legislation and new
institutions will not be preserved, if efforts to secure it by argument to fellow citizens may be
construed as criminal incitement to disobey the existing law—merely, because the argument
presented seems to those exercising judicial power to be unfair in its portrayal of existing evils,
mistaken in its assumptions, unsound in reasoning or intemperate in language.”).
214. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
215. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
216. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
217. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
218. Id. at 375 n.2.
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silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.” 219 For democratic
reasons as well as a deep-seated skepticism, Holmes and Brandeis
argued for more free speech.
B. Doctrinal Upheaval
Gradually, without settling on a single test, the Supreme Court
began upholding First Amendment challenges in the late 1920s and
1930s. In Fiske v. Kansas, a unanimous Court overturned a
conviction under the Kansas Syndicalism Act for lack of evidence. 220
In Stromberg v. California, the Court noted that the right to free
speech was included in the due process protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment and overturned a conviction for displaying a red flag. 221
As Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the majority, “[t]he maintenance
of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential
to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system.” 222 The Court was slowly embracing not only
the Holmes-Brandeis position but also its justification.
The Court decisively protected speech in 1937. In De Jonge
v. Oregon, it reversed a conviction on First Amendment
grounds because the statute prohibited speech that did not
necessarily constitute a threat to the government. 223 Chief
Justice Hughes explained,
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from
incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and
violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the
constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in
order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to
the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful
means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very
foundation of constitutional government. 224

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 377.
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931).
Id. at 369.
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
Id. at 365.
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But as Professor David Rabban notes, “the first Supreme Court
decisions in which the majority actually protected speech never
mentioned [clear and present danger].” 225
Clear and present danger did return later in 1937, in a case
upholding a First Amendment challenge. That case, Herndon v.
Lowry, turned on the “present danger” requirement. 226 In Thornhill
v. Alabama, eight members of the Court signed an opinion
rewording the test in a Holmesian manner to allow speech
restrictions “only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises
under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of
ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public
opinion.” 227 The Court explained:
The safeguarding of these rights to the ends that men may speak as
they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be
exposed through the processes of education and discussion is
essential to free government. Those who won our independence
had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning and
communication of ideas to discover and spread political and
economic truth. Noxious doctrines in those fields may be refuted
and their evil averted by the courageous exercise of the right of free
discussion. Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press,
however, impairs those opportunities for public education that are
essential to effective exercise of the power of correcting error
through the processes of popular government. 228

Justices Brandeis and Holmes had won, for now.
But speech restrictions were not entirely out of favor. Justice
Jackson dissented in Terminiello v. Chicago, voting to uphold a
speech restriction only six years after West Virginia v. Barnette, 229
which held that students could not be forced to salute the
American flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance in school. 230
Jackson’s opinion in Barnette offered a powerful defense of free

225. Rabban, supra note 209, at 1346.
226. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 261 (1937).
227. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104–05 (1940).
228. Id. at 95 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53
n.4 (1938)).
229. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
230. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

768

UDDIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

727

2/24/2016 9:17 PM

Free Speech and Public Order Exceptions

speech, stating that constitutional rights are “beyond the reach of
majorities and officials.” 231
Terminiello involved a public speech criticizing various political
and racial groups as “inimical to the nation’s welfare.” 232 In his
dissent, Jackson argued that the majority, in protecting the speech,
was overlooking a real threat to public order. Jackson examined in
detail portions of Terminiello’s speech and his testimony at trial to
demonstrate the tumultuous context of Terminiello’s speech. He
even invoked the clear and present danger standard. 233 Near the end
of the opinion, Jackson famously warned, “if the Court does not
temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will
convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.” 234
In 1951, a majority (with Justice Jackson in it) swung back
towards restricting speech. The Court in Feiner v. New York upheld
the conviction of a street corner speaker by a six-to-three vote. 235 The
speaker in that case “gave the impression that he was endeavoring to
arouse the Negro people against the whites, urging that they rise up
in arms and fight for equal rights.” 236 His speech caused some
disturbance in a mixed-race crowd, and the police arrested him when
he refused to stop speaking. 237 That same year, in Dennis v. United
States, a fractured court turned back a First Amendment challenge in
a national security case without a majority opinion. 238
Of course, as one might expect by this point in the story, the
pendulum was not done swinging. Six years later, Justice Harlan
ostensibly clarified the meaning of Dennis in Yates v. United States,
writing, “The essential distinction is that those to whom the
advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the
future, rather than merely to believe in something.” 239 Justice Harlan
cited Schenck and concluded that there was insufficient evidence to

231. Id. at 638.
232. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 3.
233. Id. at 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919)).
234. Id. at 37 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
235. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
236. Id. at 317.
237. Id. at 317–18.
238. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
239. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 324–25 (1957).
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prove the imminence of the threat or “specific intent.” 240 Entering
the 1960s, then, the clear and present danger standard was alive but
of uncertain meaning.
C. Brandenburg, Cohen, and Free Speech Today
The Court announced its current test, incitement to imminent
violence, in Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969. The rise of a “modernist
consciousness” 241 and its belief in deliberative democracy, coupled
with the emergence of political libertarianism, produced the handsoff approach to speech that reigns today.
Professor G. Edward White has identified the so-called
modernist consciousness in twentieth-century free speech doctrine.
He specifically lists “the value of scientific knowledge, the
importance of rationality, and the significance of the democratic
process in furthering individual freedom of thought.” 242 White’s
discussion of the Court’s 1970s cases notes:
Rather than assuming, as earlier courts had, that the messages in
Cohen [v. California] and Collin [v. Smith (7th Cir. 1978)] were so
patently juvenile or unsound that they played “no essential part in
any exposition of ideas,” courts in the 1970s assumed that such
messages might be sought to be suppressed because they were
“inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.” 243

This commitment to protecting even lowbrow speech is the final
leg on which modern American free speech jurisprudence stands,
along with skepticism and democratic theory. To quote Justice
Harlan in Cohen, “[i]ndeed, we think it is largely because
governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this
area [of speech] that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and
style so largely to the individual.” 244 This refusal to make distinctions,
or even try to make principled ones, explains in large part the
modern public order exception. That exception is narrow because
the Court is committed to respecting all speech, no matter how

240. Id. at 318, 330–31.
241. G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech
in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 301 (1996).
242. Id. at 304.
243. Id. at 365 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)).
244. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
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hurtful, insulting, absurd, or offensive it may be, so long as it is not
incitement to imminent violence.
This relatively freewheeling approach to speech was a shared
tenet of liberalism and libertarianism, both of which were well
represented on the Court. The author of Cohen, Justice Harlan, was
a libertarian. He was joined by three of the liberal lions (Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall) and a moderate (Justice
Stewart). 245 Brandenburg was a per curiam opinion. Justice Black, a
libertarian, and Douglas concurred, while several liberals (Marshall
and Chief Justice Warren) and another libertarian (Harlan) filed no
separate opinion. 246 Together with a commitment to deliberative
democracy and truth through debate, this refusal to label speech as
low-value and censor it underlies the current American case law.
D.

Lessons Learned

This complicated history of American free speech jurisprudence
offers several lessons for foreign countries. First, the process may not
move quickly. Although the United States now has one of the freer
speech regimes in the world, it did not settle on that law until 1969.
Nor is it an irreversible course; the United States still struggles
periodically with the temptation to expand its restrictions on speech.
In 2012, Nakoula Basseley Nakoula produced a fourteen-minute
film clip called the “Innocence of Muslims,” attacking the Prophet
Mohammed. The film sparked outrage abroad, and several American
public intellectuals have argued that the film may well fall outside the
boundaries of protected speech. 247 One of them, Sarah Chayes,

245. David J. Garrow, The Tragedy of William O. Douglas, THE NATION (Mar. 27,
2003), http://www.thenation.com/article/tragedy-william-o-douglas/; David J. Garrow,
Justice William Brennan, a Liberal Lion Who Wouldn’t Hire Women, WASHINGTON POST, Oct.
17,
2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/15/
AR2010101502672.html;
Thurgood
Marshall
Biography,
BIOGRAPHY.COM,
http://www.biography.com/people/thurgood-marshall-9400241 (last visited Oct. 13, 2015);
Al Kamen, Retired High Court Justice Potter Stewart Dies at 70, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 8,
1985, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/retired-high-court-justice-potterstewart-dies-at-70/2011/12/03/gIQA9mhjPO_story.html.
246. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449–50 (1969) (Black, J., concurring); id. at
450–58 (Douglas, J., concurring).
247. See, e.g., Anthea Butler, Op-Ed, Opposing View: Why ‘Sam Bacile’ Deserves Arrest,
USA TODAY (Sept. 13, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/story/201209-12/Sam-Bacile-Anthea-Butler/57769732/1; Sarah Chayes, Op-Ed, Does ‘Innocence of
TIMES
(Sept.
18,
2012),
Muslims’
Meet
the
Free-Speech
Test?,
L.A.
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suggests that “imminence” should be loosened to cover a period as
long as two weeks after the speech. 248 “The White House [even]
asked YouTube to review the video to see if it was in compliance
with their terms of use.” 249
Second, courts will be most successful in protecting free speech
rights when the political branches support them. The American
experience between World War I and Brandenburg could be mapped
on top of rising and falling tensions: World War I (speechrestrictive), backlash against the Red Scare (Holmes and Brandeis),
the low-tension 1930s (speech-protective), another Red Scare
(speech-restrictive), and then the aftermath of that experience
(speech-protective). When political tensions about espionage ran
high, the Court turned restrictive. When they abated, the Court
eventually returned to protection. Although correlation does not
imply causation, it is one of the only tools available to guess at the
Supreme Court’s motivations. 250
American courts came to accept limits on government
censorship of uncomfortable, hateful, or otherwise ill-meaning
speech. Although foreign countries need not embrace the
relativism of some U.S. decisions, it is important for them to
understand that (for several crucial reasons discussed below)
government cannot, and should not, censor speech for its violent
tendencies unless it is incitement to imminent violence, “fighting
words,” or one of the other narrow exceptions in U.S.

http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/18/opinion/la-oe-chayes-innocence-of-muslims-firstamendment-20120918.
248. Chayes, supra note 247.
249. Byron Tau, White House Asked YouTube to ‘Review’ Anti-Muslim Film, POLITICO
(Sept. 14, 2012, 1:20 PM), http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/09/white-houseasked-youtube-to-review-antimuslim-film-135586.html. The U.S. is not alone in struggling
with the temptation to restrict speech. Section 5 of the United Kingdom’s Public Order Act
prohibited “insulting words or behaviour” until a public outcry to expansive use of the
language resulted in its repeal. See Robert Booth, “Insulting” to be Dropped from Section 5 of
GUARDIAN
(U.K.)
(Jan.
14,
2013),
Public
Order
Act,
THE
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/14/insulting-section-5-public-order-act;
James Chapman, Free Speech is “Strangled by Law that Bans Insults” and is Abused by OverMAIL
(U.K.)
(May
15,
2012),
Zealous
Police
and
Prosecutors,
DAILY
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2145009/Public-Order-Act-Free-speech-strangledlaw-bans-insults.html.
250. And, as Part V will explain, the ultimate solution to the problem of speech with
violent tendency involves fundamental societal change.
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jurisprudence. As explained above, blasphemy does not fall into
any of the categories of unprotected speech.
V. WHY FREE SPEECH IS KEY TO STABILITY
So far, this Paper has identified the ways in which foreign courts
and politicians have used American cases to support blasphemy laws
and contrasted the international standards with the U.S. version. But
even in the discussion of how and why U.S. free speech law changed
as it did, this Paper has not yet explained why American standards
should be emulated. I offer two reasons. First, in the short term, the
American doctrine actually prevents disorder. And second, in the
long term, it prevents the infantilization of society and actually
encourages the flourishing of religion.
A. Overly Restrictive Speech Laws are Counterproductive
The best way to prevent violence is to punish the violent actor,
not the nonviolent speaker. Pakistan has upheld laws that prohibited
nonviolent speech on religion, in the name of preserving public
order. But violence is far more effectively controlled if states enforce
laws that punish criminal behavior, such as laws against arson,
murder, and other forms of intimidation and endangerment of
religious persons. This sort of legal scheme also makes sense because
it protects the fundamental human right to free religious expression.
Individuals have the right to not only hold particular beliefs but also
to express them in public—as long as they are peaceful and do not
contravene the rights of others. This works in favor of the larger
society rather than against it, as only in a free marketplace of ideas
can those ideas with greater utility or persuasive power prevail. 251
Under the Pakistani blasphemy laws, the State de facto
supports—in fact, incentivizes—incidents of violence, even though
the purpose of the laws is to reduce violence motivated by religion.
Blasphemy laws appease rather than control violent actors, giving
them license to continue bullying religious minorities while the

251. Under U.S. law, when speakers are punished, such as in the case of incitement to
imminent violence or fighting words, the speaker’s intentional state of mind is key: “[O]ne
who intends to spur a criminal response on the part of his audience is arguably less deserving
of protection . . . than one who recklessly creates that risk.” Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion? The
Brandenburg Test and Speech that Encourages or Facilitates Criminal Acts, 38 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 1, 81 (2002).
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police look the other way. They create a culture of impunity where
increasingly egregious crimes are committed with little or no
consequences for the criminals.
Rather than punishing the speaker in order to prevent violence
by others, the law should compel potentially violent people to
control their own behavior—even in the face of insults. In American
jurisprudence, this principle is called the “hostile audience”
doctrine. 252 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “[a]s a general
matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens
must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to
provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the
First Amendment.” 253 In weighing the cost of imposing speech on
unwilling listeners against the cost of preventing speech, the Court
determined that the latter cost would be greater. 254
Empirical work confirms this idea. As Professor W. Cole
Durham, Jr. testified to the Constitutional Court of Indonesia in the
Indonesian Blasphemy Act challenge, “empirical studies analyzing
these issues in virtually all the countries on earth demonstrate that
government efforts to constrain religious freedom and coerce
conformity are in fact the most significant factor leading to
interreligious violence.” 255 Durham also noted that “[t]he resulting
conflicts are etched into collective memories of opposed groups,
providing seemingly inexhaustible sources of hate, resentment and
recrimination, sometimes extending across generations.” 256 To stop
this cycle of religious hatred, countries should enforce laws against

252. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951) (“We are well aware that the
ordinary murmurings and objections of a hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence
a speaker.”).
253. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
254. Id.; see also WOJCIECH SADURSKI, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ITS LIMITS 88
(Francisco J. Laporta et al. eds., 1999).
255. Judicial Review of Law Number 1/PNPS/1965 Concerning the Prevention of
Religious Abuse and/or Defamation: Case No. 140/PUU-VII/2009 Before the Constitutional
Court of Indonesia (2010) (testimony of W. Cole Durham, Jr., Director, International Center
for Law and Religion Studies Brigham Young University), in INDONESIA: A RESOURCE GUIDE
FROM THE LEGAL TRAINING INSTITUTE 58 (2012) (citing Brian J. Grim, Religious Freedom:
Good for What Ails Us?, REV. FAITH & INT’L AFF., Summer 2008, at 3, 5 (2008); BRIAN J.
GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND
CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011)).
256. Durham, supra note 255, at 59.
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violence and allow free expression on matters of religion, subject
only to narrow exceptions like the public order justification. 257
In a study cited by Professor Durham above, sociologists Brian
Grim and Roger Finke specifically found that “[g]overnment
regulation is the strongest predictor of religious persecution even
when controlling for other possible explanations.” 258 In particular,
they concluded that religious freedom leads to “a rich pluralism
where no single religion can monopolize religious activity, and all
religions can compete on a level playing field. Religious grievances
against the state and other religions are reduced because all religions
can compete for the allegiance of the people without the interference
of the state.” 259 Additionally, religious freedom “decreases the ability
of any single religion to wield undue political power.” 260 Less
freedom of religion leads to more persecution, which in turn leads to
less freedom of religion. 261 On the other hand, as Grim has argued
elsewhere, more freedom of religion leads to benefits for society,
which in turn leads to more freedom of religion. 262
In fact, Justice Brandeis made a very similar argument in his
Whitney concurrence. He wrote that the Founders
knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of
punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage
thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for
evil counsels is good ones. 263

American free speech jurisprudence rests, among other things,
on the empirically verified belief that stability should come

257. See Asma T. Uddin, The Indonesian Blasphemy Act: A Legal and Social Analysis, in
PROFANE: SACRILEGIOUS EXPRESSION IN A MULTICULTURAL AGE 223 (Christopher S.
Grenda et al. eds., 2014); Asma T. Uddin, Indonesian Blasphemy Act Restricts Free Religious
Expression, HUFFINGTON POST (last updated May 25, 2011, 4:20 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/asma-uddin/the-indonesian-constituti_b_554463.html.
258. Brian J. Grim & Roger Finke, Religious Persecution in Cross-National Context:
Clashing Civilizations or Regulated Religious Economies?, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 633, 654 (2007).
259. Id. at 636.
260. Id. at 637.
261. Id. at 652.
262. Grim, supra note 255, at 3–4.
263. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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through punishment of violent acts and not punishment of nonviolent speech.
B. Restrictive Speech Laws Limit the Process of Rational Debate
Individuals need to overcome their biases about other religions,
instead of being told by the government how to think or feel. Doing
otherwise only infantilizes members of a society. To begin with,
government is not well suited to censoring ideas based on their
content. By deviating from the state’s legitimate role in protecting
each speaker’s right of expression, governments in states with
blasphemy laws have made themselves the arbiter of which ideas
warrant protection and which do not—an untenable proposition as
spiritual truths do not lend themselves to empirical proofs. 264
Furthermore, anti-religious speech can be difficult to define, and
restricting it can unduly hinder controversial truth claims.265
Empowering the state to impose its subjective notions of “good”
speech creates a cover for censoring all manners of dissent. The U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief has made a
similar point:
Although legislation that punishes defamation, including
blasphemy, is designed to protect religion and addresses a
legitimate concern, particularly with regard to phenomena such as
fear of Islam and Christianity, it must be acknowledged that
blasphemy or defamation are increasingly used by extremists to
censure all legitimate critical debate within religions . . . or to bring
to
heel
certain
minorities
accused
of
holding
erroneous views . . . . 266

264. It was thus argued in a court case in Victoria, Australia, by Muslims attempting
to enforce an ‘anti-vilification’ law very similar to ‘defamation of religion’ measures
that ‘truth is not a defense’ when the defendant, a Pakistani-Christian pastor,
attempted to read from the Qur’an during his court testimony to show that his
statements regarding Islam were Qur’anic.
BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS, SUBMISSION TO
OSCE
HUMAN
DIMENSIONAL
MEETING
2008
4
n.12
(2008),
http://www.osce.org/odihr/34182?download=true. Local authorities have already used the
‘anti-vilification’ law to prohibit the public reading of the Qur’an “because some Muslims
deemed those passages to be defamatory of Islam.” Id.
265. Id. at 5.
266. Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Comm. on Freedom of Religion or Belief,
Civil and Political Rights, Including Religious Intolerance, ¶ 187, Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2001/63 (Feb. 13, 2001) (by Abdelfattah Amor).

776

UDDIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

727

2/24/2016 9:17 PM

Free Speech and Public Order Exceptions

For this reason, as well as out of recognition for the broader
importance of free speech for societies, governments should endorse
more protective speech laws. 267
C. Limited Debate Prevents True Religious Flourishing
More centrally, re-assessment of a faith can help keep it
vibrant and relevant to changing circumstances. Criminalizing
blasphemy or “defamation of religions” stifles such exploration
and is thus destructive to religious reform. It chills religious
speech not just in the context of inter-religious dialogue, but also
among members of the same faith who seek to explore and
challenge their beliefs together with the laudable aim of spiritual
and intellectual growth. Religion can hinder as well as help a
society’s development. Deciding what the problematic aspects are,
and how they should be fixed, is not the place of government,
practically or in principle. Rather, governments should allow free
speech and free exercise to ensure that religions remain vehicles
for finding truth and personal fulfillment.
CONCLUSION
Since its inception in Enlightenment political philosophy, the
notion of free speech has been inexorably tied to the idea of political
dissent. The recognition of a need for strong public debate on issues
that impact society implicates the need for a diversity of voices to
formulate such debate. This in turn means that individuals must have
liberty—liberty to give voice to ideas that may be unpopular or in
direct opposition to the ideas of those in power. As the fledgling
democracies of the world struggle to locate the appropriate
intersection between safeguarding individual liberties and protecting
collective sensitivities, it is important that they foster a vibrant and
open marketplace of ideas (to accurately paraphrase Justice Holmes).
U.S. law has erred on the side of liberty for over four decades now.

267. Sadly, there are many examples of radicals attempting to silence intellectual debate
under cover of restricting religious speech. In Egypt, academic Nasr Abu Zayd was effectively
banished from his homeland for academic writings about the nature of the Qur’an. In Kuwait,
another professor was investigated for opposing the adoption of Sharia law. And in Lebanon, a
composer was charged with blasphemy for singing a verse of the Qur’an Koran. Mona
Eltahawy, Lives Torn Apart in Battle for the Soul of the Arab World, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.)
(Oct. 19, 1999 9:09 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/oct/20/1.
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For both U.S. foreign policy makers and those in Muslimmajority countries seeking more liberal speech laws, the good
news is that many countries look to the U.S. for guidance. The
challenge is that many of them, like Pakistan, willfully or
innocently misunderstand the nature of the U.S. standard. I
therefore recommend that foreign courts, U.S. policymakers, and
other stakeholders:







Continue drawing on U.S. free speech standards as a
model and source of legitimacy for reform.
Clarify that “incitement to imminent violence” requires
incitement of third parties, intent to incite, and a
likelihood of imminent violence.
Build on the Rabat Plan by encouraging countries to
move away from “defamation of religion” and towards
the U.S. standard.
Encourage courts, politicians, and voters to reject the
idea that government can, or should, censor unpopular
or hateful speech short of the exceptions in U.S. law.
Promote religious freedom as a means of promoting stability.
Promote religious freedom as a means of fostering
stronger religious belief and a stronger society.

Following these ideas can lead to more liberal free speech laws in
Pakistan and similar countries where citizens are suffering from deep
injustices simply on account of their faith and religious views.
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